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 ‘Modern’ Madrasa: Deoband and  
Colonial Secularity 
Brannon D. Ingram ∗ 
Abstract: »Eine ‚moderne‘ Madrasa: Deoband und koloniale Säkularität«. This 
article situates the emergence of the Deoband movement, an Islamic revivalist 
movement based at India’s Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband madrasa (seminary), within 
concepts of colonial secularity in British India. It shows how the decline of first 
Mughal and then British patronage for Islamic learning, as well as the post-
1857 British policy of non-interference in ‘religious’ matters, opened up a space 
for Deobandi scholars to re-conceive the madrasa as a ‘religious’ institution ra-
ther than one engaged in the production of civil servants, to reimagine the 
‘ulama’ as stewards of public morality rather than professionals in the service 
of the state, and to reframe the knowledge they purveyed as ‘religious’ 
knowledge distinct from the ‘useful’ secular knowledge promoted by the Brit-
ish. The article treats this production of ‘religious’ knowledge and space as dis-
course of distinction similar to those explored elsewhere in this HSR Special Is-
sue. 
Keywords: Islam, colonialism, madrasa, modernity, secularity. 
1. Introduction 
In the aftermath of the failed Indian uprising of 1857, the Government of India 
Act of 2 August 1858 disbanded the East India Company and transferred sov-
ereignty over India to the queen. On 1 November 1858, Queen Victoria issued 
the following proclamation to her new subjects: 
Firmly relying ourselves on the truth of Christianity, and acknowledging with 
gratitude the solace of religion, we disclaim alike the right and the desire to 
impose our convictions on any of our subjects. We declare it to be our royal 
will and pleasure that none be in anywise favoured, none molested or disqui-
eted, by reason of their religious faith or observances, but that all shall alike 
enjoy the equal and impartial protection of the law; and we do strictly charge 
                                                             
∗  Brannon D. Ingram, Northwestern University, 1860 Campus Drive, Crowe Hall 4-135, Evans-
ton IL 60208, USA; brannon.ingram@northwestern.edu. 
 This article is a condensed version of the first chapter of my book, Revival from Below: The 
Deoband Movement and Global Islam, published by the University of California Press and 
the Regents of the University of California. I thank both for permission to reprint material 
from my book in Historical Social Research. 
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and enjoin all those who may be in authority under us that they abstain from 
all interference with the religious belief or worship of any of our subjects on 
pain of our highest displeasure. (Philips and Pandey 1968, 11) 
While at first glance this may strike some as a policy of benign non-
interference, Karena Mantena argues that it was, far more, a concession to 
“native inscrutability” (Mantena 2010, 4). Simply put, the British concluded 
that the events of 1857 had primarily ‘religious’ – rather than social, political, 
or economic – causes. From 1857 onward, as Ilyse Morgenstein Fuerst demon-
strates, ‘religion’ became the primary lens through which the British under-
stood their Muslim subjects, and any subsequent resistance to British rule was, 
necessarily, born of purely ‘religious’ motivations (Fuerst 2017). 
Demarcating a religious space ostensibly free from interference was a strat-
egy of rule the British had adopted elsewhere. Throughout their colonies, from 
Ireland to India, the British advanced policies of disestablishment – a rule to 
which the Church of England at home was an exception – facilitating the emer-
gence of ‘religion’ as a private domain of conscience that Muslims and Hindus 
alike became keen to protect against state encroachment (Chatterjee 2011, 11). 
Some of the British, accordingly, saw the Victorian Proclamation not so much 
as constraining British interference in native religious affairs as consigning 
religion to a “private” domain that facilitated, rather than restricted, Christian 
missions. The barrister P. F. O’Malley saw the Proclamation as authorizing 
Christian missionary efforts even by an official of the empire, who is “still left 
to follow in his private capacity the dictates of religious duty, and to assist as 
he has hitherto done in the great Missionary work” (O’Malley 1859, 6).  
The Proclamation also pointed to a new, albeit tenuous, notion of the ‘secu-
lar’ in colonial India. Scholars have long dismissed earlier notions of the secu-
lar as the decline of religion. They have also challenged more recent notions of 
the secular as religion’s privatization. Scholars have, most recently, understood 
the secular as a form of power that distinguishes ‘religion’ from its various 
others – whether ‘superstition,’ ‘culture,’ ‘politics,’ or something else (e.g., 
Agrama 2012; Asad 2003; Fernando 2014; Nedostup 2010). Following Robert 
Cover’s dictum that “Every denial of jurisdiction […] is an assertion of the 
power to determine jurisdiction and thus to constitute a norm,” Iza Hussin sees 
the Victorian Proclamation as a performative act (“juris-diction”), declaring 
which spaces would be marked by “religion” and which would remain under 
the purview of the state (Hussin 2016, 63-4). Post-1857 discourses of official 
neutrality towards natives’ ‘religion’ were in large part discourses that named a 
range of phenomena – institutions, traditions, forms of knowledge – as ‘reli-
gious.’ Indeed, as I explore below, the British were willing to support madras-
as only if their curricula included ‘secular,’ and not only ‘religious,’ subjects.  
In 1866, just a few years after Victoria’s Proclamation, the Dar al-‘Ulum 
Deoband was founded and, soon, began to fill this new space marked off as 
‘religious.’ It was precisely within an emergent colonial modernity that the 
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madrasa as a ‘religious’ space and the ‘ulama’ as a class of ‘religious’ scholars 
became entrenched in the very identity of the Deoband movement. This article 
explores a number of questions at the origin of Deoband. Why did a movement 
that claimed to seamlessly revive Islamic tradition emerge precisely at the 
height of colonial modernity, with all of its political, epistemic, and psychic 
ruptures? To what extent is the movement’s valorization of ‘tradition’ an out-
come of that very modernity? This article suggests it is too simple to view 
Deoband as “traditional” in some respects (for instance, in terms of accentuat-
ing Hadith and Islamic law) and “modern” in others (institutionally and admin-
istratively resembling a British college more than a classical madrasa, for 
example). It proposes, rather, that tradition and modernity are so co-
constitutive that Deoband’s traditionalism is what makes Deoband modern. 
Deobandi valorization of “tradition” – as, above all, in its singular focus on 
“transmitted” knowledge (manqulat) above its “rational” counterpart 
(ma‘qulat), discussed below – is hard to conceive before colonial modernity 
and emergent discourses of the Indian secular gave new meaning to tradition 
itself. Deoband as a “religious” institution with a mission to promote 
knowledge of Qur'an, Hadith and Islamic law, and the ‘ulama’ as “religious” 
scholars charged with cultivating public morality, are two sides of the same 
coin minted in the 19th century. Moreover, while the texts that Deobandi 
scholars study are not modern, the idiom through which they communicate that 
learning to the public is, in part because ‘the public’ itself is largely (though not 
exclusively) modern (Scott and Ingram, 2015). 
To be clear, I am not arguing that Deoband is solely the product of colonial 
modernity. For one, such an argument would grossly overstate the extent to 
which colonialism shaped the lives of the colonized. Much recent literature on 
colonialism has, in fact, stressed the limits of colonial power and imperial reach 
(e.g., Tambe and Fischer-Tiné 2009). More importantly, it would understate the 
extent to which the Deoband movement is anchored in texts and discourses that 
long predate colonialism. I see modernity, therefore, not as something that 
‘happened’ to the Deoband movement. It is not a reified ‘thing’ that travels 
from Europe to India, a “virus that spreads from one place to another,” in San-
jay Subrahmanyam’s words. It is, rather, a “global and conjunctural phenome-
non” (Subrahmanyam 1998, 99-100). 
I speak of ‘modernity’ here in two distinct but intersecting registers. The 
first comprises the sum total of new ideas, practices, institutions, and socialities 
that scholars often call “colonial modernity.” In the following, I seek to deline-
ate how Deoband emerged within and against colonial modernity while heed-
ing Frederick Cooper’s warnings against reifying ‘colonial modernity’ as an 
agent in its own right (Cooper 2005, 117, 142-3). The second is modernity as a 
reflexive attitude, a self-conscious distanciation between past and present, 
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especially insofar as it values the present over the past.1 Broadly, I show here 
how Deobandi scholars were profoundly shaped by the first modality of the 
modern – institutionally, discursively, and in what they regarded as properly 
‘religious’ – even as they consciously rejected ‘modernity’ in the second sense. 
That is, Deobandis did not understand their movement as a ‘modern’ one, let 
alone modernist. Most Deobandis understood themselves as anti-modern.2 But 
in making this claim, we must also be attentive to the ways in which Deobandis 
understood the very category of the ‘modern’ (jadid). Ashraf ‘Ali Thanvi (d. 
1943), for example, conceived modernity in epistemic terms. For him, it was an 
attempt by certain Muslims to adapt ‘Islamic’ knowledge to Western science. 
Typified by Sayyid Ahmad Khan (d. 1898), this ‘modern theology’ (‘ilm al-
kalam al-jadid) was anathema to Thanvi, an intellectual capitulation to the 
modern against which he believed the madrasa should serve as a bulwark.3 
(Thanvi 1926) In short, the Deoband movement is ambivalently modern, thor-
oughly shaped by, and inseparable from the contexts of its origin at the height 
of British imperial domination and the changes – social, institutional, techno-
logical, political, economic – that it ushered in, even as many Deobandi schol-
ars resolutely rejected ‘modernity’ as they construed it.  
This article makes two main arguments. First, the Victorian discourse on re-
ligion and religious institutions after 1857 intersected with, and amplified, 
Muslim scholars’ reimagining of the madrasa as a ‘religious’ space and the 
knowledge they had mastered as ‘religious’ knowledge, in contrast to the ‘use-
ful’ secular knowledge promoted by the British. Second, in the wake of Mughal 
decline and the near-evaporation of the traditional patronage networks they had 
supported, the ‘ulama’ rebranded themselves as custodians of public morality 
rather than professionals in the service of the state – a state that had largely 
ceased to exist – a simultaneous de-professionalization and privatization of the 
‘ulama’ through which they took on a more active role in shaping individual 
subjectivities and public sensibilities. They did so within an emergent discur-
sive space marked off as ‘religious’ and, in this sense, colonial secularity oper-
ated as a discourse of distinction that was, nonetheless, never uniform and 
always liable to fluctuations. 
                                                             
1  Numerous scholars have discussed this aspect of modernity. See, inter alia, Giddens 1990 
and Koselleck 2002. 
2  This is an ambivalence comparable to the one that Humeira Iqtidar examines in contempo-
rary Pakistan, where, she argues, Islamist groups like Jama‘at-i Islami and Jama‘at ad-Da‘wa 
simultaneously reject ‘secularism’ yet facilitate discourses of the secular. See Iqtidar 2011, 
38-54. 
3  Thanvi indicates that he was inspired, in part, by the Ottoman jurist Husain al-Jisr al-
Tarablusi’s (d. 1909) influential critique of scientific materialism, al-Risala al-Hamidiyya 
(1888), translated into Urdu in 1897 (Thanvi 1926, 4). On Husayn al-Jisr, see Elshakry 2013, 
131-59 and 356, n. 34. 
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2. A “Modern” Madrasa 
The Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband is a particularly renowned madrasa in a long histo-
ry of Islamic educational institutions, going back at least to the 10th century, 
when the first madrasa originated in Khurasan. The madrasa subsequently 
spread to Baghdad by the mid-11th century, to Cairo in the late 12th century, 
and eventually to India by the early 13th century (Berkey 1992, 8-9). In time 
the madrasa became, along with the Sufi lodge (khanqah), the most recogniza-
ble and near-ubiquitous institution of medieval Islamic society. Traditionally, 
madrasas’ principally oral mode of learning centered around the memorization 
of texts. This does not mean that these texts were somehow frozen; instead, as 
Michael Chamberlain elegantly expressed it, they were “enacted fortuitously in 
time,” and could thus be invoked to serve various needs in various contexts 
(Chamberlain 1994, 143). In the medieval madrasa, there was no set curricu-
lum, no slate of exams; students who mastered a given text would get an ijaza, 
a certificate permitting them to transmit those texts in turn. Indeed, during this 
period, it was less important “where an individual studied” as it was “with 
whom one had studied,” a system that “remained throughout the medieval 
period fundamentally personal and informal, and consequently, in many ways, 
flexible and inclusive” (Berkey 2007, 43). And since they did not charge tuition 
fees, madrasas typically depended on charitable endowments (awqaf) to sus-
tain themselves.  
The Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband changed much of this, even as Deobandi schol-
ars sought to retain key features of the oral economy of the transmission of 
Islamic learning. Over the course of several years after 1866, Deoband’s 
founders implemented a number of novel innovations: a fixed program of study 
for all students, a slate of exams to gauge students’ progress, formal graduation 
ceremonies, a central library, salaried faculty, and purpose-built structures for 
study and instruction as opposed to mosques or homes. Students would come to 
Deoband, in theory, not to study with a specific person – though the renown of 
specific scholars did attract students from far and wide – but to study at Deo-
band as an institution. In these respects, it bore more resemblance to British 
colleges in India than the classical madrasa. Indeed, Barbara Metcalf argued 
that it was at Delhi College where Muhammad Qasim Nanautvi (d. 1880) wit-
nessed the advantages of the British administrative approach to educational 
institutions – ironic given the lengths to which early Deobandis sought to avoid 
British influence in virtually all other spheres of Muslim public life (Metcalf 
1994, 94). 
But it was the founders’ conscientious decision to rely on individual dona-
tions, rather than political or courtly patronage, that most distinguished it as a 
‘modern’ madrasa. In the older system of patronage, a donor (waqif) was typi-
cally rooted in a specific neighborhood or town, was affiliated with a specific 
family, and knew the beneficiaries of their donation (Kozlowski 1985, 60-78). 
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By contrast, Deoband began with a handful of tiny donations from local Mus-
lims. In one narrative told of Deoband’s origins, after dawn prayers at the Chat-
ta Masjid, Muhammad ‘Abid Husain (d. 1912), who would later become Deo-
band’s first chancellor (muhtamim), made a pouch from a handkerchief and 
went around the neighborhood collecting donations: two rupees here, five 
rupees there. As an historian of the Dar al-‘Ulum observed, “It was strange and 
novel indeed to establish an educational institution with public donations 
(‘awammi chande) which would be free from the influence of the government” 
(Rizvi 1977, vol. 1, 150-1). Barbara Metcalf rightly saw the “participation of 
people with no kin ties and the system of popular financing” as the twin pillars 
of the Deobandi approach (Metcalf 1982, 94). 
The Dar al-‘Ulum was, notably, not a charitable endowment (waqf).4 Na-
nautvi himself made this a centerpiece of his vision for the institution. In his 
founding principles for the Dar al-‘Ulum, Nanautvi stipulated, first and fore-
most, that “as much as possible, the workers of the madrasa should always 
seek to increase donations” and to seek them from the “commoners” (‘awamm) 
who would receive divine blessing (baraka) for their donations. He urged fu-
ture leaders of the institution to avoid “assured income,” noting the “harms of 
patronage from the government and the affluent” (Tayyib 1957, 9-11). This 
model, dependent on individual donors, was easily replicable. The second 
seminary based on the Deobandi model, Mazahir al-‘Ulum in Saharanpur, was 
founded a mere six months after Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband (Zakariyya 1972, 5; 
Mirathi n.d., 22). Muhammad ‘Abid Husain, meanwhile, remained active in 
soliciting funds for a new congregational (jami‘) mosque, begun in 1870, that 
would accommodate the seminary’s growing number of students. This was 
significant both because the mosque was built with individual donations and 
because it broke with the precedent of having only one congregational mosque 
per city – Deoband already had one, built in the early 1st century – whose 
Friday khatib was appointed by the ruler, a political context that no longer 
applied after 1857 (Haroon 2017, 84-7). 
It is for all these reasons that Margrit Pernau calls Deoband a “project of the 
emerging middle class,” in which the ongoing importance of birth and lineage 
was complemented by “piety, asceticism and a willingness to work hard” (Per-
nau 2013, 273). What Pernau also calls the “privatization of the ulama” was 
premised, in part, on breaking those relationships of patronage and reconstitut-
                                                             
4  However, it did in time court the support of wealthy patrons, most notably the Nizam of 
Hyderabad, who became an annual contributor to the institution (Minault 1998, 197). Inter-
estingly, while the end of Hyderabad’s princely state in 1948 naturally meant the end of the 
Nizam’s patronage, Nehru intervened personally to continue monthly support for the Dar 
al-‘Ulum Deoband from the central government, insofar as “Deoband has provided quite a 
good number of nationalist Muslim workers.” Deoband was not unique in this regard. Nehru 
did the same for Aligarh Muslim University, Benares Hindu University, and a number of oth-
er institutions that the Nizam had supported (Sherman 2015, 80). 
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ing the madrasa as a ‘private’ space – but ‘private’ only insofar as it was inde-
pendent of the state (Pernau 2003, 110). These ‘private’ ‘ulama’ were intimate-
ly involved in the constitution of new publics. I argue, however, that this valor-
ization of lay Muslim patronage and rejection of government and courtly 
support are twin manifestations of a broader trend in how the Deobandi ‘ula-
ma’ began to understand themselves as custodians of lay Muslim sensibilities 
rather than professionals in the service of the state. This, in turn, depended on 
etching out a purely ‘religious’ space for the madrasa itself. 
3. Conceptualizing ‘Religious’ Knowledge, Making 
‘Religious’ Experts 
There were other dimensions of the Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband that were deeply 
entangled with colonial modernity. The very idea of the ‘ulama’ as exclusively 
(or near-exclusively) ‘religious’ professionals was fairly novel. There are ante-
cedents for this notion in the premodern period, of course. As early as the Delhi 
Sultanate, Zia al-Din Barani (d. 1357) distinguished between the ‘otherworldly’ 
‘ulama’ (‘ulama’-yi akhirat) and those who opted for a ‘worldly’ career (‘ula-
ma’-yi duniya) (Ahmad 1970, 6). But under the Delhi Sultans, the principal 
function of madrasas was educating scholars for state employment (Riaz 2010, 
71). The Mughals, too, patronized Islamic educational institutions which 
trained the ‘ulama’ to become civic officials. The most well-known example of 
this mutually dependent relationship between Mughal administration and the 
‘ulama’ was Farangi Mahall, a family of scholars named after the residence 
(mahall) in Lucknow given to the family by the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb 
(d. 1707) that had been previously occupied by a wealthy European (farang). A 
member of this family, Mulla Nizam al-Din (d. 1748), created the Dars-i Ni-
zamiyya (The Nizami Curriculum) in the early 18th century, stressing the ra-
tional sciences (ma‘qulat) to prepare young ‘ulama’ for work in the civil ad-
ministration of new princely states that emerged in the wake of the post-
Aurangzeb fragmentation of Mughal power (Malik 2008a, 199; Robinson 
2001, 44-46, 53). The ma‘qulat included subjects such as logic (mantiq), phi-
losophy (hikmat), dialectical theology (kalam), rhetoric, and astronomy, distin-
guishing them from the ‘transmitted’ sciences (manqulat) – Hadith studies, 
Qur’an exegesis (tafsir), and Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). As Mulla Nizam al-
Din designed it, the Nizami curriculum only contained one work on Hadith: the 
Mishkat al-Masabih (Ikram 1975, 606). 
Scholars during this period did not see the manqulat and ma‘qulat as rival 
discourses of knowledge – let alone seeing the one as ‘religious’ and the other 
as ‘secular’, as Yoginder Sikand has noted – but as complementary parts of the 
same whole (Sikand 2005, 34; Islahi 2007, 29-30). This complementarity has 
roots that stretch back long before the colonial period, as Jamal Malik observes. 
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Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406), for one, distinguished between “traditional” (naqliyya) 
sciences (studies of the Qur’an and sunna) and “philosophical” (‘aqliyya) sci-
ences. While emphasizing the manqulat, Shah Wali Allah, too, believed the 
ma‘qulat allowed scholars to, in Malik’s words, “strengthen faith through ra-
tional proofs” (2008b, 5-6). While the two are conceptually distinct, Ebrahim 
Moosa has rightly noted their deep interdependence. Architects of the Nizami 
curriculum understood the ma‘qulat to provide the intellectual resources for 
comprehending the manqulat (Moosa 2015, 110 and passim). The ma‘qulat 
were regarded as being useful for training individuals for careers in administra-
tion because they developed critical intellectual skills. One historian of Islamic 
education in India argues the whole point of the ma‘qulat was “exercising the 
mind” (zehni mashq) (Islahi 2007, 82). Philosophy and logic were not studied 
as ends in themselves, but were understood by the ‘ulama’ as “tools” for “men-
tal exercise” (zehni varzish) (Ansari 1973, 260). From this perspective, of 
course, the primacy of the manqulat is taken for granted; it merely argues that 
ma‘qulat are essential for understanding them. 
In Deoband’s early years, Nanautvi seems to give this complementarity at 
least partial credence. In 1873, he wrote that a student at the Dar al-‘Ulum 
would  
attain proficiency in all the rational and transmitted sciences (‘ulum-i ‘aqliyya 
o naqliyya). God willing, they will have the capacities to acquire all the an-
cient and modern sciences (‘ulum-i qadima aur jadida). The reason for this is 
that, in these madrasas … religious knowledge alone is insufficient. Rather, 
we also deal with subjects that hone the intellect, just as in previous times. 
(Rizvi 1977, vol. 1, 171) 
This is not a view shared by Nanautvi’s principal collaborator in the founding 
of Deoband, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (d. 1905). For Gangohi, the manqulat was 
not only properly ‘religious’ knowledge but the only knowledge worth know-
ing. He dismissed the ma‘qulat as useless, if not dangerous. When he became 
sarparast (‘patron’, in a spiritual rather than financial sense) of the Dar al-
‘Ulum in 1879, following Nanautvi’s death, Gangohi began to shape the Deo-
bandi curriculum according to his vision.  
Born in 1829 in the north Indian village of Gangoh, Gangohi went to Delhi 
in his youth to study Hadith with prominent Hadith scholar Shah ‘Abd al-Ghani 
(d. 1878). He was also a Sufi master of the Chishti and Naqshbandi orders 
(Mirathi 1977, vol. 1, 40-62, 88-96).5 One of the principal ways Gangohi left 
                                                             
5  The Chishti order has two branches: the Nizami branch and the Sabiri branch. The Nizamiyya 
stems from Nizam al-Din Awliya and the Sabiri branch stems from ‘Ala al-Din ‘Ali Sabir, 
both disciples of Farid al-Din Ganj-i Shakkar. The historical record on the Nizami Chishtis is 
far more profuse than that of the Sabiris. The most important Sabiri Chishti prior to the 
19th century was ‘Abd al-Quddus Gangohi, ancestor of Rashid Ahmad Gangohi. In the 19th 
century, Hajji Imdad Allah al-Makki, the latter Gangohi’s master, became the single most 
influential Sabiri master since ‘Abd al-Quddus (Ernst and Lawrence 2002, 118-19). 
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his mark on the Deoband movement is his insistence that manqulat take prece-
dence over the ma‘qulat, to the near complete exclusion of the latter.6 Gangohi 
once tried to convince his Sufi disciple Khalil Ahmad Saharanpuri (d. 1927) to 
leave his post at a madrasa after it introduced philosophy and astronomy, but 
relented when he learned that Saharanpuri would not have to teach it (Mirathi 
n.d., 61-63). Gangohi himself completed the entire Nizami curriculum as a 
student in Delhi, including all the subjects that were customary at the time: 
logic, philosophy, mathematics, and astronomy. But when he began teaching, 
he abandoned the rational sciences, seeing them as sources of “unbelief and 
associating God with others” (kufr o shirk). Gangohi once explained to a stu-
dent that the ma‘qulat was rife with statements that would invoke God’s anger 
when uttered, even by those who did not believe a word of them. The student 
protested, however: “But sir, what can we do? We are compelled [to study 
them], for without them we will not get jobs.” Gangohi replied, “If someone 
offered you a hundred rupees a month to carry a basket of outhouse waste back 
and forth across the bazaar, would your dignity permit you to take this job?” 
The student was evidently silenced (Mirathi 1977, vol. 1, 94). This was not 
merely a matter of dignity, however. The possibility that a student might inad-
vertently utter a statement of infidelity (kufr) was a matter of salvation or dam-
nation. It is for similar reasons that he urged Muslim parents in Saharanpur not 
to send their children to schools run by Christian ministers because the students 
were expected to read Christian books and sing hymns. In an 1883 fatwa, draw-
ing on Hanafi scholar Ibn ‘Abidin, Gangohi argues that deliberately expressing 
a statement of unbelief (kalimat-i kufr), even in jest, rendered one an unbeliever 
(kafir). Even parents who allowed children to attend such schools are toying 
recklessly with unbelief, he said, reasoning from a principle in Mulla ‘Ali al-
Qari’s (d. 1606) commentary on the Hanafi Fiqh al-Akbar: “Approving of kufr 
is itself kufr” (al-rida bi-l kufr kufrun). His point is simply that words have 
ontological consequences – whether they are proclaimed in a missionary school 
or a madrasa – and thus Muslims needed to approach the rational sciences with 
the utmost circumspection (Gangohi 1985, 53-5). 
Changing British policies towards the patronage of Muslim scholars was yet 
another context for this new validation of ‘religious’ knowledge over ‘rational’ 
knowledge. Initially, the British took over the patronage that had begun to 
wane with the decline of Mughal power. They relied extensively on native 
munshis (scribes) literate in Persian, the administrative and literary language of 
the Mughal empire (Bayly 1996, 69-78). When Muslims in Calcutta petitioned 
Warren Hastings, Governor-General of Bengal, to establish the Calcutta Mad-
rasa in 1780, they did so by reminding him that the Nawabs of Bengal, who 
                                                             
6  It is important to note that Deoband was not the first institution to emphasize manqulat 
over ma‘qulat. The Madrasa Rahimiyya, founded by Wali Allah’s father Shah ‘Abd al-Rahim 
(d. 1719), was perhaps the first, and certainly impacted the Deobandis (Pearson 2008, 9). 
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preceded the British, had patronized Islamic learning. Hastings was motivated 
in supporting Muslim learning by both the expediency of rule and an admira-
tion for ‘Oriental’ learning and culture. As Thomas Metcalf put it, it was a 
“mixture of scholarly curiosity and administrative convenience” (Metcalf 1994, 
10). 
But as numerous scholars have shown, Hastings’ patronage was also bound 
up with his belief that Muslims and Hindus needed to be governed by their own 
texts, for which the ‘ulama’ would serve as intermediaries and interpreters. The 
Hastings plan of governing Muslims and Hindus according to their religious 
texts was expanded in the Regulation III of 1793 (the Cornwallis Code), which 
sought to govern Hindus and Muslims according to the “laws of the Shaster 
and the Koran.” As company merchant Thomas Twining put it,  
the people of India are not a political, but a religious people […] They think as 
much of their religion as we of our Constitution. They venerate their Shastah 
and Koran with as much enthusiasm as we our Magna Charta. (“A Letter” 
1808, 405)  
The belief that Indians are inherently religious implied, for many, that the com-
pany ought to support religious institutions as a key mechanism of governance 
(Adcock 2013, 25-9). This ‘Orientalist’ position, insisting that the British 
should actively promote Islamic learning and Persian language as a means of 
creating imperial functionaries, prevailed until it was eclipsed by the ‘Angli-
cist’ position in the 1830’s, which saw Islamic (and Hindu) learning as utterly 
inferior to European learning (Zastoulpi and Moir 1999). Drawing on support 
from Evangelicals and Utilitarians, this position was exemplified most famous-
ly by the oft-cited Minute of Macaulay in 1835. The most vocal critic of the 
Orientalist position was Charles Trevelyan, who inveighed against Government 
support for Arabic and Persian, calling for the swift replacement of instruction 
in these languages with English: 
Buried under the obscurity of Sanskrit and Arabic erudition, mixed up with 
the dogmas of religion, and belonging to two concurrent systems made up of 
the dicta of sages of different ages and schools, the laws are at present in the 
highest degree uncertain, redundant, and contradictory … The expositors of 
the law are the muftis and pundits; men, who deeply imbued with the spirit of 
the ancient learning to which they are devoted, live only in past ages, and are 
engaged in a perpetual struggle to maintain the connection between the barba-
rism of antiquity and the manners and opinions of the present time. Their 
oracular responses are too often the result of ignorance, pedantry, or corrup-
tion. (Trevelyan 1838, 152-3) 
In the midst of these seismic shifts, the Deoband movement responded to the 
destruction of patronage networks with a new discourse of authenticity, cen-
tered on reconstituting ‘severed’ links to medieval disciplines of learning and 
the moral life of the individual Muslim. Carl Ernst describes this process as a 
shift  
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from a local inflection of universalist Islamicate learning under aristocratic 
patronage to a defensive posture of authenticity articulated by a new class of 
religious scholars under the pressure of foreign colonial rule. (Ernst 2011, 
250) 
The transition was not immediate, and never uniform. Gangohi’s biography is 
full of stories about Sufi disciples of his who studied at Deoband and then went 
on to work in civil administration. At one point he mused, “When we were 
students, anyone who studied Arabic would be highly valued for the top admin-
istrative posts.” Gangohi’s uncle pressured him to take a government post, but 
relented when he “realized I would never agree to work for the British” (Mira-
thi 1977, vol. 2, 290). 
It is essential to note that these shifts away from Muslim scholarly elite as 
scribes, administrative personnel, and, later, go-betweens for the British are 
essential for understanding the concomitant shift towards a new self-appointed 
role of the ‘ulama’ as stewards of public morality, exemplified by the Deoban-
dis but evident among their rivals as well. However, I do not wish to suggest 
that the ‘ulama’ were unconcerned with public morals before colonialism, in 
India or elsewhere. The inspector of markets (muhtasib) would be one example 
of a legal official whose primary role was maintaining public morals. Kristen 
Stilt demonstrates how the Mamluk-era muhtasib was essentially the public 
face of the law, “as much a part of the legal landscape as the judge or mufti,” 
tasked not only with ensuring fair and equitable trade but also with making sure 
market patrons attend congregational prayer and maintain the fast during Ram-
adan (Stilt 2011, 38-42, 73-6). In India, it appears the muhtasib under Aurang-
zeb policed public behavior such as wine-drinking and gambling (Richards 
1995, 175). The difference between these efforts and the Deobandis’ concern 
for public morality was that the latter was mediated by a new print culture in 
which Deobandi ‘ulama’ sought to shape public religiosity by way of, among 
other genres, short primers on ‘correct’ Islamic belief and practice (Ingram 
2014). 
4. “Useful” Secular Knowledge. “Useless” Religious 
Knowledge 
In the Religious Endowments Act (Act XX) of 1863, the government formally 
divested itself of any control over ‘religious’ endowments or institutions – with 
some initial legal ambiguity about what constituted ‘religion’ from the vantage 
of the state. It mandated that the government “divest itself of the management 
of Religious Endowments” and relinquished any control over religious en-
dowments’ finances or leadership, but reserved the right to continue supervi-
sion of the “secular” aspects of any endowment that was “partly of a religious 
and partly of a secular character” (Agnew 1882, 396-407). The Act was intend-
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ed to replace the Bengal Regulation XIX of 1810 and the Madras Regulation 
VII of 1817, in which the Board of Revenue effectively served as patron of 
temples and mosques, acts which came under fire from Evangelicals who criti-
cized the idea that the British should be actively involved in patronizing ‘hea-
then’ religious institutions. Nile Green has argued that the state’s retreat from 
involvement in ‘religious’ affairs created a vacuum that was filled (always 
tenuously) by a new religious “marketplace” (Green 2011, 11-2 and passim). 
Thus, we can broadly understand the period from 1780 to 1863 as one in which 
the British replaced the Mughals in patronizing Muslim law and education, and 
then created a vacuum by gradually withdrawing that patronage, culminating in 
the 1863 Religious Endowments Act. That being said, some prominent British 
continued to argue that the government should have a role in patronizing insti-
tutions such as the Calcutta Madrasa, since the scholars trained there “did not 
show any hostility to the Government during the period of the mutinies,” in the 
words of the Viscount Canning (d. 1862), Governor-General during the 1857 
Uprising (Malik 1997, 206). 
It was not only legally and discursively that Deobandis came to see the mad-
rasa as a space impervious to state intrusion; it was also physically removed. 
As mentioned, while Deoband was only a train ride away from Delhi, the qas-
bah certainly afforded Deobandis less scrutiny than they would have had in the 
city that would soon become, by 1911, the imperial capital. Deoband was 
largely beyond the radar of colonial surveillance until the early 20th century, 
insofar as they occupied a sphere of “religion” that had already been “rendered 
distinct from ‘politics’” (Green 2011, 7). The colonial archive reflects the near 
indifference of the state towards Deoband, until Deobandi ‘ulama’ became 
actively involved in anticolonial politics. When the Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband did 
come under scrutiny for the political activities of several prominent Deobandi 
scholars, the institution tried to deflect such attention by reassuring British 
officials that the institution was purely ‘religious’ and not at all ‘political.’ As 
Deobandi scholars began to support the civil disobedience movement of Gan-
dhi, the British put pressure on the Nizam of Hyderabad, who had begun con-
tributing annually to the institution beginning in 1887, to discontinue his sup-
port (Rizvi 1977, vol. 1, 200). In response, no less a political figure than 
Husain Ahmad Madani (d. 1957), then head teacher (sadr mudarris) of Deo-
band, wrote: 
I have to state that the Dar-ul-Ulum School, from the time it was brought into 
being, devoted its attention solely to imparting religious teaching and the 
propagation of the Muhammadan religion. It silently did its duty in this 
field ... In these days when political and other movements grew in India, the 
Jamiat-ul-Ulma [sic] declared the policy of the Dar-ul-Ulum on platforms and 
by means of articles published in various newspapers. The local Officers and 
the Governor of the Provinces were appraised that the Dar-ul-Ulum adhered to 
its old policy of keeping aloof from politics, and confined its activities only to 
imparting religious teaching, and so far as it could be imagined, no suspicion 
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attached to the working of its Dar-ul-Ulum and to the policy it followed. 
(“Letter” 1931, emphasis added) 
This was, to be sure, a strategy on Madani’s part to deflect suspicion away 
from Deoband, but it points to a larger assumption about the madrasa as an 
‘apolitical’ space. By the early 20th century, then, it seems mutually exclusivity 
of religion and politics was self-evident, to the extent that what Deobandis did 
was not only accepted as ‘religious,’ but the memory of it ever being anything 
but religious was a blurry one. Thus, a certain Maulvi Rahim Bakhsh of Baha-
walpur concluded, after a visit to Deoband in 1908, “the instruction in this 
seminary, in accordance with the older style of the East, is purely religious 
(khalis mazhabi)” – even though this ‘style’ was, in fact, quite new (Rizvi 
1977, vol. 1, 219, emphasis added). 
The transition of the ‘ulama’ from ‘worldly’ state-employed professionals to 
‘otherworldly’ religious experts is mirrored in the transition from a madrasa 
education as ‘useful’ knowledge to ‘useless’ knowledge. That is, as a madrasa 
education was rebranded as ‘religious,’ it ceased to be ‘useful.’ The discourse 
on useful knowledge goes back to the origins of the British presence in the 
subcontinent, but it is especially the product of Utilitarians’ critiques of Indian 
learning generally and their fierce opposition to supporting ‘Hindoo’ and ‘Ma-
homedan’ institutions of learning specifically. The Education Despatch of 1854 
was perhaps the definitive call for supplementing, if not replacing, “Asiatic 
learning” with “useful” knowledge. It was nothing less than “one of our sacred 
duties to [confer] upon the natives of India those vast moral and material bless-
ings which flow from the general diffusion of useful knowledge, and which 
India may, under Providence, derive from her connexion with England” (House 
of Commons 1854, 155-73). But this attitude already bore real consequences 
for decisions surrounding the funding and patronage of Islamic educational 
institutions. Thirty years before the Despatch, James Mill lambasted the use of 
government funds for ‘native’ colleges in an 1824 letter to the revenue depart-
ment: “The great end should not have been to teach Hindoo learning or Ma-
homedan learning, but useful learning.” In establishing “Seminaries for the 
purpose of teaching mere Hindoo, or mere Mahomedan literature,” he contin-
ued, “you bound yourselves to teach a great deal of what as frivolous, not a 
little of what was purely mischievous, and a small remainder indeed in which 
utility was in any way concerned” (Moir and Zastoupli 1999, 116). With the 
retreat of British patronage underway, Muslims in Calcutta pleaded in 1835 to 
keep the Calcutta Madrassa open, defending madrasa education as ‘useful’ 
precisely because it would lead to government work. They praised the British 
for their support of “kazee[s],” for the use of “futwahs in trials,” and defended 
the Madrassa on the Anglicist’s terms:  
Through the establishment of the Mudrissa, many students are annually in-
structed in useful knowledge, and thence proceeding into the interior obtain 
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high appointments in the cities and zillahs [districts] of Hindoostan. (Moir and 
Zastoupli 1999, 190 and 192) 
Despite such pleas, support for madrasas diminished and madrasa education 
was increasingly condemned as ‘useless’ because it was essentially religious. 
Colonial authorities believed primary level religious education (e.g., in village 
maktabs) could be the basis of overcoming Muslims’ “backwardness” and 
forming loyal subjects, so long as they taught a mix of “religious” and “secu-
lar” subjects (Sengupta 2011). In December 1867, a little over a year after the 
madrasa at Deoband was founded, the British government approved a grant of 
50 rupees per month to the Mahomedan Female School in Bangalore “on con-
dition that the ordinary branches of secular knowledge should be regarded as an 
essential part of the education course in that institution,” insisting on “secular 
reading and writing” in addition to “Alcoran” (India Political Department, coll. 
54). Even this concession to religious subjects was too much for some British 
administrators. In June 1858, a director of public education in the Punjab re-
ported going through “all the old Persian books […] prohibiting everything 
which is grossly indecent on one ground, and everything which pertains to 
religion on another ground.” The same director criticized the local policy of 
hiring teachers from madrasas to teach in newly established public schools, 
and providing funds for schools connected to mosques: “while proclaiming our 
principle of religious neutrality, and our desire to spread secular education, we 
[are] propagating Muhammadanism.” Accordingly, he ordered “all village 
schools to be removed from the precincts of mosques and other buildings of a 
religious character [and] the disuse of all books of a religious character in the 
schools” (Leitner 1971, Appendix VI, 19-20; Zaman 2002, 63). Here, seculari-
ty is defined partly through subjects of study and partly through spaces of 
study. 
Madrasas that taught only “religious” subjects could not qualify for gov-
ernment support, hence an 1872 survey of the Northwest Provinces classified 
such schools as “indigenous (unaided),” meaning they received no government 
funding. Among the “indigenous” schools surveyed were the then-new semi-
naries of Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband and Mazahir al-’Ulum Saharanpur (Atkinson 
1875, vol. 2, 192-93). In the same year, a commission led by Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan called for Muslims to establish schools where “useful knowledge might 
be taught along with religion” (Khan 1872, 8). But the madrasas of the “old 
system,” the report averred, listing Dar al-‘Ulum Deoband as a prime example, 
were “altogether useless to the nation at large, and … no good can be expected 
from them” (Khan 1872, 55, emphasis added). The Indian Education Commis-
sion of 1882 encouraged local Muslim schools (maktabs) to add “secular” 
subjects, but as late as 1892 a report in Bengal lamented that the “course of 
instruction” in such schools “does not go beyond the mere mechanical repeti-
tion of the Koran” and does not impart “any real practical education” (Sengupta 
2011, 137). 
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In a searing indictment of this approach to ‘indigenous education,’ published 
in 1883, the Orientalist G. W. Leitner, Principal of Government College La-
hore, argued that such disrespect for religious learning forced the ‘ulama’ to 
withdraw into enclaves defined principally by their distinction from ‘secular’ 
education. Due to British meddling, the cultivation of “sacred classical lan-
guages” was monopolized by a “priestly class” who “withdrew into the back-
ground.” “By the elimination of the priestly classes from our educational coun-
cils,” he concludes, the British 
introduced a social bouleversement, in which neither birth nor traditional rank, 
nor the reputation of piety, liberality, or courage, seemed to weigh with Gov-
ernment […] against the apparently more practical usefulness of the supple 
parvenus who began to monopolise official favour. (Leitner 1971, ii-iii, em-
phasis in original) 
Leitner’s view, of course, was not universal among his contemporaries. An 
1885 report on the Northwest Provinces and Awadh concluded that “no special 
measures on behalf of Muhammadans are required, as Mussalman education in 
these provinces is by no means in a backward state” (Malik 1997, 209). Never-
theless, Leitner’s diagnosis might illuminate why scholars like Gangohi “with-
drew into the background” and saw the madrasa as just such an enclave. In a 
letter written in 1884, a year after Leitner’s study was published, Gangohi 
inverted the calculus of ‘useful knowledge,’ writing that it is, in fact, philoso-
phy – an important feature of the ma‘qulat – that is useless: 
Philosophy is a useless thing. No conceivable benefit (nafa‘) can be gained 
from it. Three or four years are wasted on its study. It dulls the minds of men 
and distracts from religious matters. 
“Thus,” he goes on, “this wicked art has been removed from the madrasa and 
has not been taught at the Deoband madrasa in the last year,” though he sur-
mises that some teachers continued to teach it clandestinely (Gangohi 1996, 
52). If Gangohi is correct, the shift away from the ma‘qulat at Deoband was 
abrupt indeed, for as Leitner himself observed, the Deoband curriculum still 
included numerous works on logic, astronomy, geometry, and mathematics as 
late as 1882 (Leitner 1971, 76). Other Deobandis, too, proudly defended the 
anti-utilitarianism of the madrasa. Khalil Ahmad Saharanpuri’s relatives want-
ed him to learn English and get a position in the government. “God saved me 
from learning English and gave me the fortune of religious knowledge (‘ilm-i 
din),” he declared (Mirathi n.d., 23). In an essay written in 1912, Ashraf ‘Ali 
Thanvi, likewise, concluded the madrasa should be “a purely religious school. 
It should neither be influenced by, nor mixed with, worldly concerns,” for to 
mix “worldly and religious aims would ultimately lead to a worldly orienta-
tion” (Thanvi 2004, 667). 
The point is that Thanvi was already operating in a colonial episteme in 
which a religious/secular binary was hegemonic, for even attempts to describe 
the mutual imbrication of the ‘religious’ and the ‘secular’ in pre-colonial Mus-
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lim education were bound by the inevitable recourse to that binary. As a 1936 
study of Islamic education before the British put it:  
Education was regarded as a preparation for life and for life after death. Hence 
it was that religion was at the root of all study: Every maktab and madrasah 
had a mosque attached to it, and in every mosque there were separate classes 
for the instruction of students in sciences other than religious, so that secular 
instruction might go hand in hand with religious instruction. (Jaffar 1936, 28, 
emphasis added) 
Noting that the secular and religious go “hand in hand” still presupposes the 
distinction itself. 
Muslims in India and elsewhere, of course, have pushed back against such a 
stark epistemic breach between the religious and the secular in Muslim educa-
tion. In 1927, the British convert to Islam, Marmaduke Pickthall, castigated 
madrasas that shun ‘modern’ knowledge under the pretext of calling it ‘secu-
lar’, for, in his view, Islam reveres all knowledge as ‘religious.’ “Most Mus-
lims nowadays speak of religious education as something quite apart from 
education as a whole, as if it meant the teaching of Fiqh [law] only,” he wrote.  
From the proper Muslim standpoint, all education is alike religious. […] In a 
real Muslim school, there would be no separate ‘religious’ education […] No 
terms such as ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ exist in proper Muslim phraseology. 
(Pickthall 1927, 101) 
From a historical perspective, Pickthall had a point. As Muhammad Qasim 
Zaman has shown, while the notion of ‘useful’ (nafi’) knowledge certainly has 
some precedent in medieval Islamic societies, the notion of the madrasa as 
“purely religious” does not. It is an “eminently modern” one with “little prece-
dent in medieval Islamic societies” (Zaman 2002, 64). It is, I would argue, an 
example of how the discourse of modernity produces its other. As Ebrahim 
Moosa argues,  
The very success of the secular public square anticipates and requires the 
emergence of an exclusive religious sphere. Hence the madrasas fill that ex-
clusive religious sphere with consummate ease and enable the discourse of in-
dividual religious salvation to morph into identity politics. (Moosa 2015, 200)  
Just as the first Deobandis conceived of the madrasa as a ‘religious’ space set 
against colonial secularity and considered themselves as ‘religious’ experts, 
whose signature distinction was the mastery of knowledge for which colonial 
authorities had no use, they also looked beyond the madrasa to emergent pub-
lics of lay Muslims whose salvation they took it upon themselves to safeguard. 
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